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Chapter X 
Not the Usual Suspects: Religious Leaders as Influencers of International 
Humanitarian Law Compliance 
Ioana Cismas and Ezequiel Heffes*
 
Abstract It is undeniable that the effectiveness of international humanitarian law (IHL) faces 
challenges from different quarters. To address these, humanitarian organizations have, in the 
main, pursued a direct engagement strategy with the parties to a conflict. Although this has 
remained the dominant strategy to date, in the last two decades the humanitarian sector has, on 
an ad hoc basis and without the benefit of a solid evidence base, engaged other societal actors 
identified as having the potential to influence parties to armed conflict, and among them 
religious leaders. This chapter addresses the role of these leaders in influencing compliance (or 
lack thereof) with IHL by States and non-State armed groups. In particular, two issues are 
explored: 1) what makes religious leaders influential among their constituencies?, and 2) how 
can they be useful actors to increase respect for IHL in armed conflict? 
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X.1 Introduction 
That the effectiveness of international humanitarian law (IHL) faces challenges from different 
quarters is not news. Seventy years after the adoption of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 
enforcement and, more generally compliance with treaty and customary IHL remain the 
Achilles heel of this legal regime.1 Difficulties related to respect for IHL can be linked to a 
number of circumstances, such as the unwillingness of States to acknowledge that a situation 
of violence amounts to an armed conflict,2 the absence of an incentive for the parties to abide 
by humanitarian rules,3 or non-State armed groups’ (NSAGs) lack of an appropriate structure 
and resources allowing them to acknowledge, understand, and implement some of their 
obligations.4 Moreover, despite the proliferation of international criminal tribunals and United 
Nations (UN) commissions of inquiry, IHL relies on relatively weak enforcement mechanisms, 
which may not induce the parties to comply with the applicable legal framework.5 Whilst 
violations of IHL occur on a daily basis, enforcement mechanisms are rarely known by fighters 
on the ground,6 and they largely depend on the parties’ capacity and willingness to implement 
them.7 These features are a tall order in many of the current conflict settings, which are 
characterized by fragmented NSAGs fighting each other or governmental forces representing 
the ‘remainders of collapsed State structures’.8  
These realities disclose the importance of implementing strategies specifically aimed at 
generating respect for the law. The humanitarian sector—an umbrella term covering a variety 
of actors such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Call and other 
non-governmental (NGO) humanitarian organizations, and the UN through its different 
 
1 Krieger 2015, p 1. 
2 ICRC 2003, p 20; Clapham 2006, p 12. 
3 Krieger 2015, pp 4-5 (affirming that “[a]ctual decisions to obey a legal norm result from a complex mixture of 
diverse motivations. Power relations as well as historical, political, social and anthropological conditions 
determine these motivations so that compliance is context-dependent”). 
4 Bangerter 2011; ICRC 2003, pp 20-21; Heffes 2018. 
5 States acknowledged this weakness during the 31st International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, 
emphasizing in a resolution “the importance of exploring ways of enhancing and ensuring the effectiveness of 
mechanisms of compliance with IHL, with a view to strengthening legal protection for all victims of armed 
conflict”. ICRC 2011, p 2. 
6 Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 2014, p 22 (affirming that in the context 
of a study in which the reaction to international norms of more than thirty groups were explored, some NSAGs 
“were not aware of the prohibition of child recruitment and their potential exposure to prosecution by the 
International Criminal Court and other tribunals”).  
7 As Weinstein has correctly identified when dealing with NSAGs, international criminal tribunals, as mechanisms 
of deterrence of IHL violations, depend “on the fact that individuals care about the future”. Weinstein 2007, p 350. 
For discussions related to the deterrent effect of international criminal justice, see Cryer 2015; Jenks and 
Acquaviva 2014.  
8 Krieger 2015, p 1. See also Chinkin and Kaldor 2017, p 11 (noting that while “[o]ld wars were fought by regular 
armed forces wearing uniforms and those recruited by the state through conscription or payment [...] the 
participants in the new wars are often loose and fluid networks of state and non-state actors that cross borders”).  
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agencies and bodies—are engaging with State and non-State parties to armed conflicts in an 
attempt to positively influence their behavior and to generate greater compliance with IHL and 
international human rights law (IHRL). These interactions, which are multi-layered and take 
place both formally and informally, have mainly relied on the direct humanitarian engagement 
with those participating in hostilities. Despite some success, violations of IHL persist,9 
showcasing the importance of reflecting on novel approaches to increase the respect for this 
legal regime. A complementary strategy to the one undertaken by the abovementioned 
organizations focuses on the engagement of powerful societal actors that might influence the 
parties’ behaviors.  
It is in this context that the chapter examines one aspect that has remained largely 
underexplored: the role of religious leaders in influencing compliance with IHL. In particular, 
two issues are addressed: 1) what makes religious leaders influential? and 2) how can they be 
useful actors to increase the level of respect of IHL in armed conflict? These are not theoretical 
queries—they respond to specific gaps identified by the ICRC in a recent study, when 
underscoring the acute need for a solid knowledge base to inform the humanitarian engagement 
of societal actors, including religious leaders.10 The study’s findings posit that some of these 
entities are capable of significantly influencing the behavior of States and NSAGs in as far as 
the humanitarian norms receive “greater traction” by “[l]inking the law to local norms and 
values”.11 This scenario, indeed, allows for individual members of the parties to a conflict to 
better internalize the standards, which in turn promotes restraint in war in a more durable 
manner.12 It is at this juncture where this chapter takes shape. It intends to enhance the 
understanding of the role(s) of religious leaders in armed conflict.  
 
X.2 Compliance with International Humanitarian Law: Setting the Scene 
 
9 This was explicitly confirmed by the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children in Armed 
Conflict in 2018 who noted that despite “[d]irect engagement with both government forces and armed groups has 
brought significant commitment and results to better protect conflict affected children”, grave violations against 
them continue “in every conflict situation—from the Central African Republic to Iraq, Somalia and Yemen”. UN 
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict 2018. 
10 ICRC 2018. 
11 Ibid., p 9. 
12 Ibid. 
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Generally, compliance has been defined as “behavioural conformity with existing norms and 
regulations.”13 For States and NSAGs, this implies that their behaviors are in accordance with 
IHL.14 
It is important to complexify our understanding of compliance: parties to an armed conflict 
should not be seen as entities that either violate or respect IHL in toto, without exception. 
Instead, they often follow certain rules while disregarding others.15 For instance, a NSAG may 
respect the prohibition on hostage-taking, while violating the prohibition on using and 
recruiting children in hostilities.16 Similarly, a State may deliberately attack health care facilities 
and transports in breach of IHL, while avoiding the forcible displacement of civilians. Parties 
also often modify their behaviors during an armed conflict, reflecting an increase or decrease 
in their level of compliance with humanitarian provisions. This variation is evident, for instance, 
during peace processes, when NSAGs or States seek political recognition before local or 
international constituencies. They might adopt a very different attitude when they are actively 
engaged in hostilities, a moment in which they may attempt to show their military strength.17  
Compliance, therefore, should be understood as a spectrum, rather than an on/off switch.18 
States and NSAGs’ behaviors in armed conflict are better conceptualized as “a matter of degree 
varying with the circumstances of the case.”19 Parties should be conceived as dynamic actors, 
 
13 Jo 2017, p 65.  
14 The ICRC has defined ‘compliance’ as the observance and implementation of IHL. ICRC 2015a. This, of course, 
does not deny in any way the application of IHRL in times of armed conflict, which has been recognized by the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) on several occasions. See ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, [1996] ICJ Rep 226; ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a 
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, [2004] ICJ Rep 136. The ICJ also 
confirmed that IHRL is applicable in situations of armed conflict in a case concerning armed activities in the 
territory of the Congo. ICJ, Case concerning Armed Activities on the territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic 
of the Congo v Uganda), Judgment, 19 December 2005, [2005] ICJ Rep 168. The application of IHRL to NSAGs 
has also gained a momentum in the last few years. See in this sense, Clapham 2006; Murray 2016; Fortin 2017; 
Rodenhäuser 2018.  
15 Gross 2015, p 74 for this analysis with respect to NSAGs.  
16 Different explanations have been provided by NSAGs for their refusal to uphold the prohibition of recruiting 
and using child soldiers: children may be seen as an important resource for NSAGs’ survival; the fact that 
international standards do not match with local custom and norms about adulthood; and that children are seen as 
easily influenced and recruited. Other explanations are related to NSAGs’ lack of capacity to actually determine 
when an individual is a child or an adult, at least according to international law, and the lack of socio-economic 
alternatives for children. Furthermore, international law includes different standards for this prohibition. While 
IHL refers to 15 years old as the minimum age for recruitment, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict affirms that “[a]rmed groups that are distinct 
from the armed forces of a State should not, under any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under 
the age of 18 years”. 
17 This was clearly seen during the peace negotiations between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP), when the latter agreed to release children from its ranks at the final stage 
of the conflict. Casey N (2016) Colombia and FARC Rebels Reach a Deal to Free Child Soldiers. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/16/world/americas/colombia-and-farc-rebels-reach-a-deal-to-free-child-
soldiers.html. Accessed 23 September 2019. 
18 Falk 1964, p 5. See also Chayes and Chayes 1995, p 17. 
19 Falk 1964, p 5.  
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weighing the costs against the benefits of complying with international law. In turn, the costs 
and benefits analyses involve an evaluation of material facts as well as ideatic aspects. In this 
sense, the results will vary depending on the parties’ goals and the moment when the behavior 
takes place.20 Understanding such a variation is crucial for humanitarian actors when 
determining a strategy of direct engagement with the parties and of engagement with their 
possible influencers, including religious leaders.  
The above-discussed behavioral variation ties into, and needs to be considered in association 
with, systemic and institutional challenges to the effectiveness of IHL. Systemic challenges 
include the unwillingness of States to acknowledge that a situation of violence amounts to an 
armed conflict which therefore triggers the application of IHL.21 A related problem is the 
rejection of IHL by NSAGs because they were not involved in the international law-making 
process and regard domestic law (incorporating IHL norms) as belonging to the opponent and 
thus not something that they wish to obey.22 Some NSAGs identify international law “as biased 
and privileging States”.23 In a similar vein, these non-State entities may perceive some 
humanitarian norms as prohibiting actions that “often serve the strategic interests of rebel 
groups—the sort of actions that may, at times, give them a competitive advantage over 
government forces.”24 
Institutional challenges stem from the lack of appropriate organizational structures and 
resources allowing States and NSAGs alike to acknowledge, understand, and implement their 
humanitarian obligations.25 This challenge is faced particularly in those conflicts occurring in 
areas where the State has limited control over territory and the rule of law system is very 
fragile.26 The increasing fragmentation of NSAGs, which has contributed to conflicts that are 
“more violent, longer lasting and harder to resolve”,27 is a reflection of acute institutional 
challenges. Furthermore, non-State entities may not be aware of their international obligations. 
As Bangerter correctly notes, “only a relatively small circle of persons are aware of legal 
concepts in any given society, and it is unlikely that leaders of armed groups will be recruited 
in this particular circle.”28 NSAGs may not know, for instance, what medical ethics and triage 
 
20 Fazal 2018, p 59. 
21 ICRC 2003, pp 20-21. 
22 Jo 2015, p 256. See also Heffes and Kotlik 2014, p 1202 (arguing that “[f]rom a practical point of view, it seems 
unlikely that [NSAGs] will accept any set of rules merely by the fact that it has been previously agreed upon by 
States, be it customary or treaty law”); Henckaerts 2003.  
23 Geneva Call 2016, p 25. 
24 Jo 2015, p 6. For further reasons, see Bangerter 2011; Jo 2017. 
25 Cismas and Heffes 2017. 
26 Krieger 2015. 
27 Blakke et al. 2015.  
28 Bangerter 2015, p 113. 
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imply or how to deal with humanitarian access, key principles for the delivery of health care by 
humanitarian organizations.29 In a recent study, Geneva Call found that several NSAGs felt that 
they did not have a complete understanding of the rules governing some of these issues and 
consequently were “not able to elaborate on what they entail”.30  
These difficulties reinforce the importance of developing and implementing strategies aimed 
at generating respect for IHL. Key humanitarian organizations have traditionally relied on direct 
engagement with the parties to a conflict to generate compliance.31 This approach prioritizes 
the incorporation of humanitarian norms in the parties’ internal rules, in their training and 
accountability mechanisms, and excludes—in the main—reliance on underlying values to 
underpin humanitarian norms.32 While this has remained the dominant strategy, in the last two 
decades the humanitarian sector has, on an ad hoc basis, engaged other societal actors that have 
the potential to influence parties to armed conflict, and among them religious leaders.33 Certain 
ICRC initiatives have sought to build the capacity of religious leaders and faith-based 
organizations with the aim to achieve greater understanding of IHL.34 Recent reflection within 
the ICRC has led to greater concern on how different mechanisms—beyond legal norms and 
direct engagement—can “influence—or at least generate gradual changes in—the behavior of 
NSAGs”.35 The Roots of Restraint in War study, for example, seeks to understand the impact 
 
29 Heffes 2019, p 234. 
30 Geneva Call 2016, p 14. 
31 Schneckener and Hofmann 2015; Quintin and Tougas 2020. In the last few years, there has also been an 
increasing intervention of UN bodies on issues related to compliance for IHL and IHRL. For instance, through its 
child protection framework, States and NSAGs can engage with UN agencies and sign ‘action plans’, which could 
lead to delisting them from the UN Secretary-General’s list of actors that commit one or more of the five grave 
violations of children’s rights. For more information, see UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General for Children and Armed Conflict (https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/) and Kotlik 2020. For the 
reference to both IHL and IHRL, see UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for 
Children and Armed Conflict (2013), p 10. 
32 ICRC 2004. Recently, the ICRC has begun a process of reflection indicating a greater openness to less formal 
mechanisms of influence. Following the 2004 study Roots of Behaviour in War, the ICRC asserted that “legal 
arguments were more durable than moral arguments when seeking to convince combatants to respect humanitarian 
norms during warfare”. In contrast, the 2018 Roots of Restraint in War study explores the formal and informal 
sources of influence on the development of norms of restraint in State armed forces and NSAGs. Terry and 
McQuinn 2018. 
33 Quintin and Tougas 2020, p 371. Interestingly, this is seen with caution by the authors, who explain that engaging 
other societal actors “may also mean opening a Pandora’s box of sensitive issues for a neutral organization [...]. 
[L]ooking at sources of influence will include examining not only the role played by local communities and cultural 
or religious leaders, but also the role played by donors, economic partners, political powers, etc.”. Quintin and 
Tougas 2020, pp 370-371. 
34 ICRC 2015a. See also ICRC 2019b (stating that “[t]he crucial role of religious leaders and faith-based 
organisations and in times of conflict and humanitarian crisis is now increasingly appreciated, and the ICRC has 
striven over recent years to engage influential religious circles more systematically”). 
35 Quintin and Tougas 2020, p 370. 
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of formal processes on vertically-organized NSAGs and the formation and impact of informal 
processes on more horizontally structured groups.36  
The engagement of religious leaders has attracted attention in UN fora as well. For example, 
UN bodies with a development remit have established strategy frameworks and guidelines on 
engaging with faith-based organizations and religious leaders in recognition of the roles which 
these entities play in development work in various countries.37 The UN Development 
Programme notes that “[i]n addition to providing spiritual and traditional guidance, [faith-based 
organizations] and [religious leaders] are part of the social fabric of communities and some may 
have greater access, scale and legitimacy than local governments. In fragile states, [faith-based 
organizations] and [religious leaders] may be the only actors offering basic social services.”38 
Engagement in the development context is geared less towards influencing respect for norms—
whether IHL or IHRL norms—and more towards establishing “partnerships in the context of 
humanitarian aid projects, development programmes, public education activities, and 
interreligious dialogue initiatives”.39 A common denominator, largely flowing from the 
mandates of these organizations, seems to be the insistence on “shared values, objectives and 
commitments”.40  
Closer to the aim of this chapter, that of exploring modalities for inducing norm-compliance, 
is the Fez Process, and the Plan of Action for Religious Leaders and Actors to Prevent 
Incitement to Violence that Could Lead to Atrocity Crimes released in 2017 by the UN Office 
on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect.41 Another important initiative which 
seeks to advance freedom of religion and other human rights through inter-faith dialogue and 
cooperation is the Faith for Rights framework.42 These instruments reflect an acknowledgment 
of the strong potential of religious leaders to influence followers of their faith towards 
compliance with international law. 
 
X.3 Religious Leaders: Interpreters and Influencers  
The analytical category of religious actors can be empirically delineated to include those States 
and non-State entities that grant religion a central place in their functioning by means of 
 
36 Ibid. 
37 UN Population Fund 2009; UN Aids 2009; UN Development Programme 2014; UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees 2014; UN Environment Programme 2018. 
38 UN Development Programme 2014, p 5. 
39 Wiener 2012, p 37. 
40 See UN Development Programme 2014, pp 3, 6, 12. See also a discussion in Wiener 2012. 
41 UN Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect 2017. 
42 See, generally, UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2017. 
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adopting a religious organizational structure, religious doctrine, religious motivations, or by 
espousing a predominantly religious discourse.43 Whereas their religions, goals, and indeed the 
forms they take differ—and therefore we can distinguish between individual religious leaders, 
non-State religious associations, NSAGs, religious States of various denominations and even 
an inter-governmental organization44—what unites religious actors is a common claim that they 
are legitimate interpreters of religion. 
It is evident that an empirical method which offers indicia as to whether an actor can be 
considered to be a religious one relies on observation and social perception. The process 
involves prior experience, motivations, expectations, and the filtering of information through 
such lenses.45 In the case at hand, this may entail that the definition of a leader as a religious 
actor will be affected by an assessment of what a specific religion is understood to be, or should 
be. Such an outcome goes against the intention of this chapter, and the use of religious leaders 
as an analytical category. In this sense, the examples enumerated in the following pages have 
been chosen intentionally so as to expound different religions. The intention was therefore not 
to pass value judgement in relation to religion(s) but instead to “operationalize an analytical 
category of actors with certain common functional or operational characteristics of which 
shared values are not one”.46 
Based on this empirical approach, this chapter will further argue that religious leaders are 
individuals who assume the role of interpreters of religion and in doing so they sometimes 
‘speak’ about IHL (Sect. X.3.1). In putting forward their interpretations, they draw on a 
‘special’ legitimacy which demands obedience from their followers and may influence the 
parties’ compliance—or lack thereof—with IHL (Section X.3.2).  
Two further caveats should be addressed. First, whilst the examples of religious leaders 
examined in this chapter concern in the main individual religious leaders, we recognize that 
these individuals can, and often do, act as part of wider networks or formalized institutional 
structures or, indeed, that religious leadership can be exercised by an informal/formal group47 
 
43 Cismas 2014, pp 50-55. 
44 Cismas argued that the intergovernmental Organization of Islamic Cooperation falls within the analytical 
category of religious actors. Cismas 2014, pp 239-304.  
45 Ibid., p 52. 
46 Ibid.  
47 For an example of women exercising religious leadership collectively through a church group in an effort to 
mediate between the parties to the Solomon Islands conflict, see discussion in Cismas 2017, pp 317-318; Snyder 
2009. Note that the ‘Generating Respect for Humanitarian Norms’ project seeks to explore a larger spectrum of 
religious leadership (individual, collective, institutionalized) informed by the realities of our case study countries: 
Colombia, Libya, Mali, Myanmar. For more information about the project, see 
https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=ES%2FT000376%2F1. 
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or institution.48 Second, the term religious leaders may overlap with ‘religious personnel’ as 
defined in IHL, but is not restricted to the latter, as the study is also concerned with actors that 
may not be stricto sensu “attached to a party to the conflict, to its medical units or transports or 
to a civil defence organization”.49! 
 
X.3.1 Do Religious Leaders ‘Speak’ about International Humanitarian Law? 
Over the past decades, on numerous occasions, priests, ministers, imams or rabbis have 
‘spoken’ about international rules and have attempted to influence the behaviors of parties to 
an armed conflict.50 This section will provide four examples of religious leadership reflecting 
different armed conflicts, religions, and relationships to armed actors. The rationale of the 
section is twofold. On the one hand, the empirical reality of religious actors’ involvement in 
armed conflict, whilst non-uniform, will emerge as a key reason why religious actors as 
interpreters of humanitarian norms should be studied by researchers and considered by the 
humanitarian sector. On the other hand, the illustrations will allow us to preliminary point to 
some factors that may shape the influence of religious leaders in times of conflict. 
Israel offers the first example of religious leadership, which we shall explore here. Rabbi 
Shlomo Goren, the first Chief Rabbi of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), is said to be the 
architect of “the modern corpus of Jewish law and ethics relating to war and the military” by 
both shaping the role of the IDF Rabbinate and issuing a number of halakhic (religious) rulings 
on military conduct.51 Some rabbis have transferred principles that were not originally intended 
for the military context to the latter to account for the fact that references in the Bible to 
‘collateral damage’ and the prohibition of use of certain types of weapons were missing 
altogether.52 As a result of subsequent military rabbis’ interpretations of religion, and 
specifically the establishment of institutional arrangements that enabled the service of religious 
soldiers—to the point that they now represent a significant number in multiple combat units53—
 
48 The IDF Rabbinate and Islamic State (IS) examples, respectively, which are developed infra, offer illustrations 
of institutional religious leadership.  
49 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005, p 90, Rule 27. 
50 The role of religious leaders as interpreters of humanitarian values should not be seen to exclude other potential 
roles that these individuals may have in conflict settings. For instance, they have been related to faith-based 
diplomacy and the full panoply of transitional justice mechanisms. See Brudholm and Cushman 2009; Vinjamuri 
and Boesnecker 2008; Cismas 2017. Furthermore, while in the Central African Republic, priests, imams and 
missionaries worked to reduce tensions between armed actors, sheltered people fleeing violence in their 
compounds, and aided, in Myanmar they created ‘zones of tranquility’ and gave protection for their followers. Fast 
2018, pp 9-10. 
51 Edrei 2006, p 255.  
52 Cohen 2007, p 19. 
53 Levy 2014, pp 277-279. See also Kornalian and Zaim 2011, pp 9-13.  
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“[r]eligion does not exist as a segmented subculture within the overall Israeli military fabric. 
Rather, it constitutes one of the IDF’s integral components”.54 Cohen, writing in 1999, argued 
that what had been achieved was “a symbiosis between religion and military service that, even 
if not altogether unique, is certainly more pervasive than that experienced in other modern 
armed forces”.55 Over a decade later, Levy describes the Israeli military’s “theocratization”,56 
despite the formal control retained by civilian authorities. His study shows that military rules  
 
gradually conformed to principles of religious doctrine as can be inferred from the empowerment of 
the military rabbinate, restrictions imposed on women’s service and the manner by which the 
military deployed its troops to deal with religious commands; and most importantly […] religious 
authorities operated in tandem with the civil-sanctioned military system, whose opinions and 
jurisprudence carried a notable symbolic weight.57  
 
A second illustration comes from the Philippines. In 2017, Sheikh Abuhuraira Abulrahman 
Udasan, the Bangsamoro mufti, issued a fatwa against radical extremism in the context of 
clashes between the government and certain groups that had pledged allegiance to the Islamic 
State (IS).58 This document was later endorsed by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), 
which “supported such edict without fear and reservation”.59 The fatwa is reported to have 
eroded support for the Maute group, including among members’ of the leader’s family.60 The 
close relationship between the Muslim legal expert and the MILF can be observed from 
previous interactions; in 2015, Sheikh Abuhuraira Abulrahman Udasan is reported to have 
headed a MILF delegation welcoming Pope Francis on his visit to the Philippines.61  
The above examples reveal two relevant aspects. First, shared religion, religious affinity or 
religious alignment between a religious leader and an armed actor appear to translate into a 
certain influence of the former upon the later. Second, the embedding of the religious entity 
within the structure of the armed actor, or a very close relationship between the two, may further 
potentiate the former’s influence.  
 
54 Cohen 1999, p 389. 
55 Ibid.  
56 Levy 2014.  
57 Specifically, Levy describes the refusal of some religious soldiers, supported or encouraged by religious 
institutions to carry out orders to evacuate illegal settlements in the West Bank. Ibid., pp 285-286. 
58 Fonbuena C (2017) MILF commits to implement fatwa vs radical extremism. 
https://www.rappler.com/nation/174775-milf-support-fatwa-radical-extremism. Accessed 18 January 2020.  
59 Ibid.  
60 International Crisis Group 2019, pp 15-16.  
61 Pangco Panares J (2015) Muslim leaders unite for Pope, seek blessing. https://manilastandard.net/news/-main-
stories/168243/muslim-leaders-unite-for-pope-seek-blessing.html. Accessed 17 January 2019. 
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A third case to examine here is the Islamic State group (IS), which is active (predominantly) 
in parts of Iraq and Syria and notoriously co-founds religious leadership and armed structures. 
In 2014 and 2015, the IS’ Research and Fatwa Department and Dabiq, IS’ English language 
propaganda magazine, published several manuals and articles seeking to justify enslavement, 
sexual slavery and rape of girls and women62 “as religiously meritorious: not just acceptable 
but a positive good. Rather than grudgingly grant its permissibility, or merely matter-of-factly 
assume its legality as most premodern texts do, IS proclaims enslavement a triumphalist 
reflection of its own legitimacy.”63 
 
The manual titled Questions and Answers on Taking Captives and Slaves stipulates that taking 
“unbelieving women”, such as “[women from among the People of the Book, i.e. Jews and 
Christians] and polytheists’ captive is permissible due to their ‘unbelief’” and that “[i]t is 
permissible to have sexual intercourse with the female captive”, citing in support a verse from 
the Koran.64 It permits the buying, selling or gifting of “female captives and slaves, for they are 
merely property, which can be disposed of as long as that doesn’t cause [the Muslim ummah] 
any harm or damage” and lays down a number of rules governing “intercourse”, including with 
minors, and beating.65 Yazidi girls who had escaped IS, reported that fighters engaged in prayer 
before and after raping them and justified the rape along the lines laid out in the IS manual.66 
In response, 126 (male) religious leaders and scholars from around the world—subsequently 
joined by others67—published an open letter to Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi and fighters and 
followers of IS,68 providing a different reading of koranic verses and asserting that “[t]he re-
introduction of slavery is forbidden in Islam. It was abolished by universal consensus”.69 
Interestingly, they note that Muslim states are parties to anti-slavery conventions and cite Al-
Isra’, 17:34 (“And fulfil the covenant. Indeed the covenant will be enquired into.”) to insist that 
Muslims must uphold their obligations.70 
 
62 On the international crimes committed by ISIS against Yazidis girls and women, see UN Human Rights Council 
(2016) International Independent Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic: “They Came to Destroy”: 
ISIS Crimes Against the Yazidis, UN Doc. A/HRC/32/CRP.2. See also Cetorelli and Ashraph 2019.  
63 Ali 2016, p 6. 
64 IS Research and Fatwa Department, ‘Questions and Answers on Taking Captives and Slaves’, cited in Roth 
2015. See also Chertoff 2017, p 1062. 
65 IS Research and Fatwa Department, ‘Questions and Answers on Taking Captives and Slaves’, cited in Roth 
2015. 
66 Callimachi 2015. 
67 For an overview of all signatories, see http://www.lettertobaghdadi.com/new-signatories/. 
68 Letter to Baghdadi 2015.  
69 Letter to Baghdadi 2015, pp 1 and 12. For a comparative analysis of the IS publications and the Open Letter 
focusing on their respective interpretation of history and the relevance of notions of authority, see Ali 2016.  
70 Letter to Baghdadi 2015, p 12. 
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The IS example serves to portray—what one reviewer of this chapter has aptly termed—“the 
elephant in the room”: religious leaders may and do also put forward religious interpretations 
which justify and encourage the breach of parties’ humanitarian obligations. The enslavement, 
sexual slavery and rape perpetrated by IS fighters are particularly horrific and their justification 
by appeal to religious interpretation is chilling to the bone; yet, they are by no means unique, 
nor are they the apanage of any one religion. Suffice to recall here that the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda had convicted clerics of various Christian denominations for 
committing or aiding and abetting genocide and crimes against humanity.71 
The example invites reflection on another ‘elephant’. Ali has observed that both the IS 
interpretations and the counter-narrative put forward in the Open Letter raise questions about 
gendered authority, because in all these documents “women are absent as authorities: the 
scholars, whether religious authorities or Western secular academics, are all male. Girls and 
women appear instead as objects of enslavement or of rescue.”72 Her observation can be 
extended to all the illustrations of this chapter, in as far as the religious leaders discussed here 
are men in authority.  
Two other reflections are in order. First, the IS example reinforces our previous observation 
that the enmeshment of the religious and military structures holds great potential for the former 
to influence—in this case negatively—the latter. Second, religious narratives may be put 
forward that seek to counter negative—or indeed positive—influence on parties to a conflict; 
whether these achieve their goal may depend less on the accuracy of the religious interpretation, 
and more on the perceived legitimacy among fighters of the interpreter, or on external factors 
unrelated or only marginally related to religion.73  
The final example draws on Pope Francis’ recent reassurance of the Holy See’s support for 
IHL.74 While noting the relevance of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 
1977 and the importance which the Holy See attaches to these treaties, the Pope observed that 
“humanitarian law presents hesitations and omissions”.75 He has encouraged combatants and 
humanitarian aid workers to find a place in their conscience to “acknowledge the moral duty to 
 
71 See ICTR, Prosecutor v Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gérard Ntakirutimana, Judgment and Sentence, 21 
February 2003, Case Nos. ICTR-96-10 and ICTR-96-17-T; ICTR, Prosecutor v Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and 
Gérard Ntakirutimana, Judgment, 13 December 2004, Case Nos. ICTR-96-10-A and ICTR-96-17-A; ICTR, 
Prosecutor v Athanase Seromba, Judgement, 12 March 2008, Case No. ICTR-2001-66-A; ICTR, Prosecutor v 
Athanase Seromba, Judgement, 13 December 2006, Case No. ICTR-2001-66-I. See also Fast 2018, p 11; Cismas 
2017, pp 314-316. 
72 Ali 2016, p 12.  
73 On the issue of foreign fighters, see Borum and Fein 2016.  
74 Holy See 2017. 
75 Ibid. 
 13 
respect and protect the dignity of the human person in every circumstance, especially in those 
situations where it is most endangered”.76 This is, by all accounts, a religious leader’s attempt 
to enhance compliance with IHL and supplement the law’s shortcomings by appeal to moral 
sources.  
The papal message finds strong echoes in—or possibly reflects—the repeated calls for a 
‘respeto a la vida’ (respect to life) espoused by numerous religious leaders throughout the 
hierarchy of the Catholic Church in Colombia and addressed to all parties to (previous and 
current) armed conflicts in the country.77 In Colombia, we find several examples of priests 
acting as mediators in hostage-situations and the Government’s explicit claim that the Catholic 
Church was “the only valid intermediary”.78 It is also worth noting that in the past numerous 
religious leaders were killed in relation to the various Colombian conflicts.79  
Whilst it goes beyond the ambit of this chapter to unpack the complex relations between the 
Catholic Church, the Government, armed groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia–Ejército del Pueblo; FARC-EP), 
the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional; ELN), and paramilitaries over 
the past five decades, preliminary research suggests that a shared religion or religious affinity 
is, on its own, insufficient in some contexts to ensure a religious leader’s influence on parties 
to conflict. The parties’ perception of the religious entity—of partisanship, for example, or 
aspects which are entirely extraneous, such as the goals of the armed actors themselves which, 
as we argued previously, are mutable during the course of a long conflict—are factors that may 
increase or decrease a religious leader’s influence in times of armed conflict.  
The above illustrations provide an emphatic answer to this section’s question: religious 
leaders have indeed put forward interpretations of religion which have a bearing on 
humanitarian norms. Not only have they had an effect on the parties’ (non-)compliance with 
these same rules, but religious leaders’ roles have been publicly recognized in the internal 
decision-making processes of States and NSAGs—such as in the cases of Israel and the IS. 
While an in-depth, critical assessment of the interpretations themselves goes beyond the scope 
of this chapter, we recognize that whether a religious interpretation seeks to reinforce, 
 
76 Ibid.  
77 Zaragoza 2020.  
78 ForumLibertas (2007) Rehenes de las FARC: la Iglesia, único intermediario válido para el Gobierno colombian 
[Hostages of FARC: the Church, the only valid intermediary for the Colombian Government]. 
https://www.forumlibertas.com/hemeroteca/rehenes-de-las-farc-la-iglesia-unico-intermediario-valido-para-el-
gobierno-colombiano/. Accessed 23 September 2019. See also Patterson E (ed) 2013; Zaragoza 2020.  
79 El Universal (2013) Desde 1984 han sido asesinados 83 sacerdotes en Colombia [Since 1984, 83 priests have 
been murdered in Colombia]. https://www.eluniversal.com.co/mundo/desde-1984-han-sido-asesinados-83-
sacerdotes-en-colombia-107440-MYEU193690. Accessed 23 September 2019. 
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contradict or modify humanitarian norms is certainly not inconsequential.80 The answer may 
have very real implications for understanding the direction of the influence of religious leaders 
on parties’ IHL compliance, as well as on whether and how a humanitarian organization may 
wish to engage with a certain religious actor. Before discussing these aspects, we shall first 
explore what makes religious actors societally influential.  
 
X.3.2 Why Might States and Non-State Armed Groups Follow Religious 
Leaders’ Interpretations on International Humanitarian Law? 
Identifying an individual as a religious leader is related to the underlining question as to why 
followers, including members of NSAGs and States’ armed forces, might obey their 
interpretations. Why would and do they act upon legal norms advocated or otherwise shaped 
by these leaders? Sociological insights may shed light on what it is about religious leaders’ 
claims to have the legitimate authority to interpret religion that sets them apart from similar 
claims by non-religious leaders and institutions.  
To begin with, the relationship between religious leaders and their adherents can be 
identified as one of command-obedience between an authority and individuals, that is, between 
a power-holder and a power-subject.81 Authorities, whether they take the form of religious or 
non-religious actors, seek to convince power-subjects that their commands are legitimate or 
‘rightful’ so that the latter will obey them; in doing so, authorities appeal to various sources of 
legitimation.82 Before addressing those sources, however, it should be recalled that legitimate 
authority is not the only form of command. It is, however, 
 
a less ‘costly’ form of authority than either coercive or reward-based authority. In the case of 
coercive authority, only constant surveillance and supervision can ensure that subordinates 
completely comply with commands, for subordinates will comply only when they face the prospect 
of punishment for non-compliance. In the case of reward-based authority, obedience has to be 
‘purchased’ through the offer of rewards for compliance. Legitimate authority obviates the need for 
surveillance and rewards, since subordinates feel obliged to obey no matter whether there is a 
‘reward’ for compliance or not.83 
 
 
80 A number of works engage in-depth with the study of religion(s) and IHL, and how substantive interpretations 
of the former can reinforce, or on the contrary frustrate, the latter. For an important recent study, see Al-Dawoody 
2011. See also Evans 2006; Cockayne 2002. 
81 Cismas 2014, p 55. 
82 Matheson 1987, 200. 
83 Ibid.  
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Dogan observes that reality can rarely be described in terms of legitimacy or illegitimacy and 
concludes that it must come in degrees.84 This is an observation shared by legal scholars in 
relation to norms of international law.85 Nevertheless, there seems to be an agreement that a 
rule is illegitimate if a majority believes it to be so.86 What needs to be recalled is that any 
authority, including religious leaders when they issue religious interpretations on IHL, strives 
to justify or to legitimate its commands. As such, legitimacy provides a sense of duty or an 
‘oughtness’ towards rules or legal norms issued by an authority.87 The power-subjects, either 
States or NSAGs, feel obliged to obey these rules or legal norms because of the legitimate 
character of the command-obedience relation, and their ‘belief’ that the authority’s conduct is 
rightful.88 Of interest for this chapter are the sources of legitimacy on which religious leaders 
draw to legitimate their authoritative interpretations. 
Drawing on Max Weber’s work—but adapting it according to the scope of this research—
scholars have highlighted the legitimacy of the law, or of the authority enforcing the law, as the 
central aspect which determines compliance.89 This observation does not negate that individuals 
follow commands for a variety of complex reasons determined, for example, by historical, 
social, and political conditions,90 and that rewards or coercion may play a role in their decision 
to comply with a rule. To clarify this complex reality, we refer to a religious leader’s ‘claim to 
legitimacy’ or ‘claim to be a legitimate authority’ to interpret religion. These expressions 
suggest that the claim of religious leaders may or may not be validated by power-subjects. When 
followers validate such claims to legitimacy, they obey the religious interpretations. In the 
absence of a validation by power-subjects, the commands may still be followed because of fear 
of punishment or interest in rewards.91  
When reviewing the different sources of legitimacy, it shall be noted that religious leaders 
draw primarily on traditional and charismatic sources. Rational-legal features, while certainly 
present, are not primarily emphasized for the purpose of convincing power-subjects to follow 
religious interpretations.92 The relation between religious leaders and their adherents is no 
different than the one between a secular (as in non-religious) democratic parliament and 
citizens. However, whereas in the latter case it is the legal-rational aspect of the law that confers 
 
84 Dogan 2004, p 114. 
85 Franck 1990, Chapter 3.  
86 Dogan 2004, p 117. 
87 Spencer 1970, p 126. 
88 Dogan 2004, pp 116-117. 
89 Jo 2015, p 27. 
90 Krieger 2015, pp 4-5. 
91 Cismas 2014, p 57. 
92 Ibid.  
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legitimacy and generates compliance, in the former case, the legitimate authority of religious 
leaders is predominantly grounded in tradition and/or charisma. This entails that adherents will 
follow a specific command, including one relating to IHL, not primarily because it has been 
derived in a legal-rational way and is fair, or because they participated (indirectly) through 
democratic processes in creating that rule, but because the religious leader is perceived to have 
the authority by virtue of tradition or charisma to issue that command. In other words, the 
special legitimacy of religious leaders may address—to a certain extent—some of the systemic 
challenges to the effectiveness of IHL outlined earlier. 
 
X.4 The Humanitarian Sector: Reasons for Engagement  
Humanitarian actors have engaged with religious leaders, as noted earlier, on an ad hoc basis. 
Their primer motivations—although not fully articulated—appear to center around three 
interrelated aspects: raising awareness about humanitarian norms among religious leaders 
themselves and their communities, strengthening the legitimacy of IHL in various local 
contexts, and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance and access to those affected by 
armed conflict.  
When engaging with States and NSAGs in a humanitarian dialogue, it is generally difficult 
to pinpoint their incentives for complying with IHL. Interpretations of religious leaders, as 
explained, do not draw their legitimacy primarily from rational-legal processes, as do laws 
adopted by parliaments or international fora. The former, instead, are grounded in tradition or 
charisma, and it is these sources which make them particularly relevant influencers in contexts 
where IHL remains largely unknown or is perceived as foreign or belonging to the opponent. 
Religious leaders, therefore, can be messengers of IHL’s values, using local religious texts and 
interpretations as a basis for the parties’ obligations.93 They can raise awareness of the 
importance of respecting humanitarian norms and mobilizing their communities and others.94 
The specific role that religious actors can play in facilitating the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance and in accessing those affected by armed conflict “by addressing misconceptions 
about international humanitarian organizations and building understanding for their work and 
 
93 ICRC 2015b. See also Aly 2014a (arguing that “aid and advocacy agencies have increasingly tried to understand 
Islamic law in order to use its humanitarian provisions as tools of negotiation with armed groups in the Muslim 
world”). 
94 ICRC 2016, p 36. Interestingly, the ICRC institutionalized this by creating in 2004 a specific unit tasked with 
developing its relations with, and understanding of, the Muslim world. Its work has focused on "forging links and 
interactions with Muslim scholars and on initiating a dialogue with them on the commonalities between IHL and 
the relevant rules of Islamic law and jurisprudence”. Quintin and Tougas 2020, pp 372-373.  
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mandate”95 should be emphasized. Effectively, what is sought through the engagement with 
religious leaders is a transfer of their special legitimacy onto humanitarian norms and 
organizations.  
With the above-considerations in mind, we note that the ICRC has engaged with religious 
leaders in respect to specific humanitarian activities. For example, when Islamist NSAGs took 
control of northern Mali in 2011, limiting access for humanitarian organizations, the ICRC had 
already established a relationship with Muslim scholars, including the High Islamic Council. It 
has been reported that through that dialogue, two groups “discussed access, humanitarian ethics 
and protection issues, and the ICRC was able to work with the Council at times as a go-between 
with the armed groups”.96 Ultimately, the Council issued a paper on the rules of engagement in 
jihad and the application of Sharia law. There, it advised against the use of corporal 
punishment.97 In Gaza, the ICRC involved imams in workshops organized together with the 
Ministry of Health to address the overcrowding of emergency departments, a serious problem 
under usual circumstance and an acute one during conflicts when medical personnel find 
themselves unable to provide timely and effective care. As a result of the workshops, religious 
leaders used key messages during their sermons and promoted them on regular radio spots on 
the Al Quraan Al Kareem station, which has hundreds of thousands of listeners.98  
More recently, experts in Islamic Law have provided the ICRC with a set of 
recommendations which envisage a more systematic engagement with religious leaders and 
scholars.99 These recommendations, and the flurry of humanitarian engagement with actors of 
various religions, may reflect the ICRCs more general openness for exploring less or informal 
mechanisms of influence, an openness signaled by the Roots of Restraint in War study. 
It is noteworthy that in September 2019, the ICRC gathered 120 individuals, including 
religious leaders, to discuss about the interface between Buddhism and IHL. The Head of the 
ICRC delegation in Sri Lanka noted that “dialogue between humanitarian organizations and 
religious leaders and academics can build solid common ground and can pass powerful 
messages to communities, arms carriers, and decision-makers”.100 In December 2019, experts 
in Islamic studies and IHL participated in a workshop jointly organized by the Al-Azhar 
 
95 ICRC 2019a. 
96 Aly 2014b.  
97 Ibid. 
98 ICRC 2016, p 36. 
99 ICRC 2019c, p 76 (The ICRC was asked to “[i]ncrease cooperation and coordination with influential religious 
scholars/leaders during armed conflict”, to include “front-line negotiators and influential religious leaders” in IHL 
discussions, and to “[u]se all the forums academics and religious leaders have to communicate pertinent messages 
to the general public”). 
100 ICRC 2019b. 
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University in Cairo and the ICRC, which aimed “at reinforcing universal acceptance of IHL 
and highlighting the humanitarian values and provisions of protection enshrined in Islamic 
jurisprudence”.101 These and other events appear to place the engagement of religious leaders 
as a humanitarian priority on the ICRC agenda.102 
Geneva Call has undertaken a similar approach. In 2014, for instance, it discussed issues 
related to the protection of civilians in conflict settings with 10 senior Sunni leaders in Lebanon, 
including the five Muftis and the Head of the Higher Islamic Shari’a Council.103 The aim of the 
meeting was to secure support for the organization’s work in engaging NSAGs in the region on 
humanitarian norms.104 The leaders “welcomed Geneva Call’s initiatives and expressed their 
readiness to facilitate the organization’s humanitarian work in Lebanon”.105 In 2019, Shia 
religious leaders from Iraq, Lebanon, Iran, Yemen, and Bahrain convened in Najaf (Iraq) under 
the auspices of Geneva Call, and committed to certain rules regarding the prohibition of forced 
displacement under IHL.106 These include, among others, the prohibition to forcibly displace 
civilians, to launch indiscriminate attacks on internally displaced people (IDP) or against their 
camps, the use of displaced people as human shields or as hostages, and the use of IDP camps 
for military purposes.107 They also affirmed their commitment “to provide the greatest 
protection to the displaced” in terms of “health, hygiene and nutrition”, by providing and 
facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance to IDPs.108 
The fundamental advantage of engaging with religious leaders may appear theoretical at 
first, but can prove to be of great practical relevance. By highlighting that religious 
interpretations supporting IHL exist (or can be crafted) and that they can be relied upon to 
induce the parties’ compliance with the law, religious leaders, and those actors engaging with 
them, dispel the myth of an unavoidable conflict between religion and law. Clearly, religious 
interpretations can and do conflict with humanitarian norms—but engagement with these actors 
can highlight areas of tension and incrementally, over time, may contribute to changes in 
 
101 ICRC 2019d. 
102 Other recent examples include Iran, where in 2016 the ICRC gathered 500 Islamic scholars, representatives of 
other faiths, and IHL experts from over 20 countries to discuss “humanitarian values common to world religions; 
the protection due to civilians, including patients and medical workers; the plight of missing persons and their 
families; proper human remains management; and environmental conservation and management”. ICRC 2017, p 
466. For similar examples in Mali, p 160; in Niger, p 173; in Uganda, p 209; in Burkina Faso, p 214; in Tunisia, p 
248; in Afghanistan, p 317; in Bangladesh, p 323; in Pakistan, p 340; in Indonesia, p 357; in Jordan, p 485.  
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interpretation. The effectiveness of this engagement—the measure of which is ultimately the 
generation of greater compliance with humanitarian norms—will largely depend on articulating 
and pursuing a future agenda of research that provides an empirical evidence base for 
understanding: which religious actors should be engaged, under what circumstances, and how. 
We propose the contours of such an agenda in the concluding section of this chapter.  
 
X.5 Conclusion: An Agenda for Further Research 
The theoretical and analytical framework which this chapter begins to outline draws on the 
existing body of literature devoted to understanding the reasons why subjects obey domestic or 
international law, including the factors that may generate or limit compliance. Traditionally, 
theories of compliance largely adopted an instrumental perspective, emphasizing the influence 
of deterrence or coercive measures, such as the imposition of sanctions for violations of the 
law109 or the risk of reputational damage that would result from non-compliance.110 However, 
the relevance and effectiveness of these factors for IHL (and to a certain extent IHRL in armed 
conflict), is limited by the regime’s weak enforcement mechanisms. The normative perspective, 
on the other hand, emphasizes the importance of factors that generate voluntary compliance, 
such as the perceived legitimacy of relevant laws,111 or the interpreter of the laws, and the sense 
of ownership for norms generated by acculturation/internalization processes.112  
Drawing on Max Weber’s work, scholars have highlighted the importance of legitimacy as 
a mechanism for generating compliance. In line with this view, where there is a lack of 
compliance-inducing mechanisms, voluntary compliance with the law may be generated by the 
perceived legitimacy of the law itself or the emitter/interpreter.113 Franck posits that the 
perceived legitimacy of a norm of international law may be generated by factors such as the 
symbolic validation of a rule or of a rule-making institution.114 In the vernacularization 
paradigm—developed by Sally Merry in the context of human rights ideas115—religious leaders 
can be seen to assume the role of ‘brokers’ that negotiate and adapt humanitarian norms to 
specific cultural settings and therefore act towards the symbolic validation of the rule. Two 
main questions arise which need to be addressed by future research endeavors.  
 
109 Tyler 2006. 
110 Chayes and Chayes 1995. 
111 Franck 1988. 
112 Koh 1997; Goodman and Jinks 2013. 
113 Franck 1988. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Merry 2006. 
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First, what motivates religious leaders to put forward interpretations of religion which seek 
to further the compliance with humanitarian norms? Acculturation theories suggest that subjects 
of the law can individually or collectively internalize a norm, therefore generating a sense of 
ownership of the norm.116 Norm acculturation or internalization may occur as a result of the 
participation of actors in making, interpreting, and enforcing law. Their role as ‘brokers’ may 
lead religious actors to feel a sense of ownership over these norms (or the underlying values), 
and in turn transfer the special legitimacy which they enjoy onto the norms. Those factors that 
can engender this sense of ownership among religious leaders may include religious values, 
local laws—including but not restricted to religious law—, norms and custom, protections 
entailed by IHL in respect to religious personnel, religious sites, and the right to religious 
freedom.  
Second, there are factors that may maximize the special legitimacy of religious leaders in 
times of armed conflict and therefore their influence on generating compliance with—or, as the 
IS case study revealed, violations of—humanitarian norms. Relevant factors may include the 
type of armed conflict, the organization of the armed actor (integrated State’s armed forces; 
centralized NSAG; decentralized NSAG; or community-embedded NSAG),117 the proximity, 
relationship and role of the religious leader with or within the structure of the armed actor, the 
armed actors’ perception of the religious leader, the latter’s societal position/perception, the 
shared (or not) religion, religious alignment or affinity with the parties, the security situation 
faced by the religious leader, their means of accessing parties and affected communities (e.g. 
direct, mediated through media), their participation (or readiness to participate) in interfaith 
dialogue and forums. Whilst the examples of religious leaders discussed in this chapter provided 
some preliminary information on some of these factors, (comparative) case studies, combining 
desk-based research with more qualitative methods, such as interviews with relevant 
stakeholders, are needed for an in-depth exploration. 
A caveat revealed by transitional justice scholarship refers to the position of a religious 
leader during conflict as victim, accomplice or perpetrator of violations, which presents very 
different opportunities for the actor’s engagement in post-conflict justice mechanisms and 
initiatives.118 A variable that will have to be considered by humanitarian organizations when 
evaluating whether the involvement of religious leaders can result in a transfer of legitimacy 
onto humanitarian norms is the religious leaders’ own record of compliance with IHL and their 
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accountability. Be that as it may, one can very well envisage situations where a religious leader 
that had put forward interpretations of religion, which conflict with IHL norms, nonetheless, 
retains influence among followers. Unlike UN bodies operating in the field of development, 
which seek to partner with religious actors in order to ensure access to local communities on 
the basis of shared values, humanitarian organizations are mandated to engage with all parties 
to a conflict, compliant and non-compliant ones. Indeed, their interest may lay precisely in 
engaging the influencers of non-compliant parties seeking thereby to establish a humanitarian 
dialogue. 
Finally, an agenda for research on the role of religious leaders in generating compliance with 
IHL must also address the behavior of humanitarian organizations while engaging these actors. 
Considerations must include aspects relating to the separation of law and religion and 
specifically the impartiality/neutrality of humanitarian organizations, to the stark—if the 
examples discussed in this chapter are in any way indicative—possibility that humanitarian 
engagement may reinforce gendered structures, roles and narratives, and to the necessary means 
to ensure genuinely participatory parameters of engagement. 
 
References 
 
Articles, Books and Other Documents 
 
Al-Dawoody A (2011) The Islamic Law of War: Justifications and Regulations. Palgrave Macmillan, New York 
Ali K (2016) Redeeming Slavery: The ‘Islamic State’ and the Quest for Islamic Morality Mizan. Journal of 
Interdisciplinary Approaches to Muslim Societies and Civilizations 1(1):1-22 
Aly H (2014a) Can Islamic law be an answer for humanitarians? 
http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2014/04/24/can-islamic-law-be-answer-humanitarians. 
Accessed 31 March 2020 
Aly H (2014b) Jihadi jurisprudence? Militant interpretations of Islamic rules of war. 
http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2014/04/24/jihadi-jurisprudence-militant-interpretations-
islamic-rules-war. Accessed 31 March 2020 
Bangerter O (2011) Reasons why armed groups choose to respect international humanitarian law or not. 
International Review of the Red Cross 93(882):353-384 
Bangerter O (2015) Comment – persuading armed groups to better respect international humanitarian law. In: 
Krieger H (ed) Inducing Compliance with International Humanitarian Law: Lessons from the African Great 
Lakes Region. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 112-124 
 22 
Blakke K, Gallagher Cunningham K, Seymour L (2015) The problem with fragmented insurgencies. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/05/13/the-problem-with-fragmented-
insurgencies/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.7c8f0edbf751. Accessed 31 March 2020 
Borum R, Fein R (2016) The Psychology of Foreign Fighters. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40(3):248-266 
Brudholm T, Cushman T (2009) Introduction: The Religious in Responses to Mass Atrocity. In: Brudholm T, 
Cushman T (eds) The Religious in Responses to Mass Atrocities. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 
1-18 
Callimachi R (2015) ISIS Enshrines a Theology of Rape. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/14/world/middleeast/isis-enshrines-a-theology-of-rape.html. Accessed 31 
March 2020 
Cetorelli V, Ashraph S (2019) A demographic documentation of ISIS’s attack on the Yazidi village of Kocho. 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/101098/1/Cetorelli_Demographic_documentation_ISIS_attack.pdf. Accessed 31 
March 2020 
Chayes A, Handler Chayes A (1995) The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory 
Agreements. Harvard University Press 
Chertoff E (2017) Prosecuting gender-based persecution: The Islamic State at the ICC. Yale Law Journal 
126(4):1050-1117 
Chinkin C, Kaldor M (2017) International Law and New Wars. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
Cismas I (2014) Religious Actors and International Law. Oxford University Press, Oxford 
Cismas I (2017) Reflections on the Presence and Absence of Religious Actors in Transitional Justice Processes: 
On Legitimacy and Accountability. In: Duthie R, Seils P (eds) Justice Mosaics: How Context Shapes 
Transitional Justice in Fractured Societies. International Center for Transitional Justice, New York, pp 302-
343 
Cismas I, Heffes E (2017) Can religious leaders play a role in enhancing compliance with IHL? 
http://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2017/12/20/can-religious-leaders-play-a-role-in-enhancing-compliance-
with-ihl-2/. Accessed 31 March 2020 
Clapham A (2006) Human Rights of Non-State Actors. Oxford University Press, Oxford 
Cockayne J (2002) Islam and international humanitarian law: From a clash to a conversation between civilizations. 
International Review of the Red Cross 84(847):597-626 
Cohen S (1999) From Integration to Segregation: The Role of Religion in the IDF. Armed Forces & Society 
25(3):387-405 
Cohen S (2007) The Re-Discovery of Orthodox Jewish Laws Relating to the Military and War (Hilkhot Tzavah 
U-Milchamah) in Contemporary Israel: Trends and Implications. Israel Studies 12(2):1-28 
Cryer R (2015) The role of international criminal prosecutions in increasing compliance with international 
humanitarian law in contemporary African conflicts. In: Krieger H (ed) Inducing Compliance with 
International Humanitarian Law: Lessons from the African Great Lakes Region. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, pp 188-216 
Dogan M (2004) Conceptions of Legitimacy. In: Hawkesworth M, Kogan M (eds) Encyclopedia of Government 
and Politics, Volume I, 2nd edn. Routledge, London, pp 110-120 
 23 
Edrei A (2006) Divine Spirit and Physical Power: Rabbi Shlomo Goren and the Military Ethic of the Israel Defense 
Forces. Theoretical Inquiries in Law 7(1):255-297 
Evans C (2006) The Double-Edged Sword: Religious Influences on International Humanitarian Law. Melbourne 
Journal of International Law 6(1):1-32 
Falk R (1964) On Identifying and Solving the Problem of Compliance with International Law. Proceedings of the 
American Society of International Law and Its Annual Meeting 58:1-9 
Fast L (2018) Crossing boundaries in protecting civilians. Mapping actors, insights and conceptual spaces. 
https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/12334.pdf. Accessed 31 March 2020 
Fazal T (2018) Wars of Law: Unintended Consequences in the Regulation of Armed Conflict. Cornell University 
Press, Cornell 
Franck T (1988) Legitimacy in the International System. American Journal of International Law 82(4):705-759 
Franck T (1990) The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations. Oxford University Press, New York 
Fortin K (2017) The Accountability of Armed Groups under Human Rights Law. Oxford University Press, Oxford 
Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights (2014) Reactions to Norms: Armed 
Groups and the Protection of Civilians. https://www.genevacall.org/wp-
content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2014/04/Geneva-Academy-Policy-Briefing-1_Amed-Groups-and-the-
Protection-of-Civilians.pdf. Accessed 31 March 2020 
Geneva Call (2014) Dialogue on the protection of civilians with 10 senior Sunni Muslim leaders in Lebanon. 
https://www.genevacall.org/dialogue-protection-civilians-10-senior-sunni-muslim-leaders-lebanon/. 
Accessed 23 September 2019 
Geneva Call (2016) In Their Words: Perceptions of Armed Non-State Actors on Humanitarian Action. 
https://www.genevacall.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/WHS_Report_2016_web.pdf. Accessed 31 March 
2020 
Geneva Call (2019) Shia Religious Leaders set precedents and agree on IDP Protection in Najaf/Iraq. 
https://www.genevacall.org/humanitarian-dialogue-shia-religious-leaders-set-precedents-and-agree-on-idp-
protection-in-najaf-iraq/. Accessed 31 March 2020 
Goodman R, Jinks D (2013) Socializing States: Promoting Human Rights Through International Law. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 
Gross M (2015) The Ethics of Insurgency: A Critical Guide to Just Guerrilla Warfare. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 
Heffes E (2019) Armed Groups and the Protection of Health Care. International Law Studies 95:226-243 
Heffes E (2018) Administration of justice by armed groups: Some legal and practical concerns. 
https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2018/11/22/administration-of-justice-armed-groups-some-legal-
practical-concerns/. Accessed 31 March 2020 
Heffes E, Kotlik M (2014) Special agreements as a means of enhancing compliance with IHL in non-international 
armed conflicts: An inquiry into the governing legal regime. International Review of the Red Cross 
96(895/896):1195-1224 
Henckaerts J-M (2003) Binding Armed Opposition Groups through Humanitarian Treaty Law and Customary 
Law. In: Vuijlsteke M, Reh C, Reynolds C (eds) Proceedings of the Bruges Collegium: Relevance of 
International Humanitarian Law to Non-State Actors 27:123-138 
 24 
Henckaerts JM, Doswald-Beck L (2005) Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge 
Holy See (2017) Address of His Holiness Pope Francis to the Participants in the Conference on International 
Humanitarian Law. https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2017/october/documents/papa-
francesco_20171028_diritto-internazionale-umanitario.html. Accessed 31 March 2020 
ICRC (2003) ICRC Expert Seminars: Improving Compliance with International Humanitarian Law. 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/improving_compliance_with_international_report_eng_2003.pdf. 
Accessed 31 March 2020 
ICRC (2004) The Roots of Behaviour in War: Understanding and Preventing IHL Violations. ICRC, Geneva 
ICRC (2011) 31st International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent: Strengthening legal protection for 
victims of armed conflict. Resolution 1. 
https://rcrcconference.org/app//uploads/2019/03/R1_Strengthening_IHL_EN.pdf. Accessed 31 March 2020  
ICRC (2015a) Strengthening compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL): The work of the ICRC and 
the Swiss government. https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/what-we-do/other-activities/development-
ihl/strengthening-legal-protection-compliance.htm. Accessed 31 March 2020 
ICRC (2015b) Faith-based organizations and religious leaders: Essential partners in humanitarian action. 
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/faith-based-organizations-and-religious-leaders-essential-partners-
humanitarian-action. Accessed 31 March 2020 
ICRC (2016) Protecting Health Care: Key Recommendations. ICRC, Geneva 
ICRC (2017) Annual Report 2016. https://www.icrc.org/data/files/annual-report-2016/ICRC-2016-annual-
report.pdf. Accessed 18 January 2020 
ICRC (2018) The Roots of Restraint in War. ICRC, Geneva 
ICRC (2019a) Partnering with community and religious leaders to help people affected by conflict. 
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/partnering-community-and-religious-leaders-benefit-people-affected-
conflict. Accessed 23 September 2019 
ICRC (2019b) Sri Lanka: Global Conference on the Interface between Buddhism and IHL. 
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/sri-lanka-global-conference-interface-between-buddhism-and-ihl. 
Accessed 31 March 2020 
ICRC (2019c) Experts’ Workshop: IHL and Islamic Law in Contemporary Armed Conflicts. 
https://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/109967/expert_workshop_on_ihl_and_islamic_law.pdf. Accessed 31 
March 2020 
ICRC (2019d) Islamic and humanitarian law experts discuss preservation of human dignity in armed conflict. 
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/islamic-and-humanitarian-law-experts-discuss-preservation-human-
dignity-armed-conflict. Accessed 31 March 2020 
International Crisis Group (2019) The Philippines: Militancy and the New Bangsamoro. 
https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/301-the-new-bangsamoro.pdf. Accessed 31 March 2020 
Jenks C, Acquaviva G (2014) Debate: The role of international criminal justice in fostering compliance with 
international humanitarian law. International Review of the Red Cross 96(895/896):775-794 
Jo H (2015) Compliant Rebels: Rebel Groups and International Law in World Politics. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 
 25 
Jo H (2017) Compliance with International Humanitarian Law by Non-State Armed Groups: How Can It Be 
Improved? Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 19:63-88 
Koh H (1997) Why do Nations Obey International Law? The Yale Law Journal 106:2599-2659 
Kornalian M, Zaim S (2011) Religion & Refusal in the IDF: Prospects for a West Bank Withdrawal. George 
Washington University Institute for Middle East Capstone Paper Series 
Kotlik M (2020) Compliance with Humanitarian Rules on the Protection of Children by Non-State Armed Groups: 
The UN’s Managerial Approach. In: Heffes E, Kotlik M, Ventura, M (eds) International Humanitarian Law 
and Non-State Actors: Debates, Law and Practice. Asser Press/Springer, The Hague/Berlin, pp 387-425 
Krieger H (2015) Introduction. In: Krieger H (ed) Inducing Compliance with International Humanitarian Law: 
Lessons from the African Great Lakes Region. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 1-10 
Levy Y (2014) The Theocratization of the Israeli Military. Armed Forces & Society 40(2):269-294 
Matheson C (1987) Weber and the Classification of Forms of Legitimacy. The British Journal of Sociology 
38(2):199-215 
Merry S (2006) Human Rights & Gender Violence: Translating International Law Into Local Justice. University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago 
Murray D (2016) Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Armed Groups. Hart Publishing, Oxford 
Letter to Baghdadi (2015) Open Letter to Dr. Ibrahim Awwad Al-Badri, alias ‘Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi’, to the 
fighters and followers of the self-declared ‘Islamic State’ (2015), http://www.lettertobaghdadi.com. Accessed 
31 March 2020 
Patterson E (ed) (2013) Colombia: Religious Actors Inspiring Reconciliation. 
https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/publications/colombia-religious-actors-inspiring-
reconciliation/pdf_download/en. Accessed 31 March 2020 
Roth K (2015) Slavery: The ISIS Rules. https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/09/05/slavery-isis-rules. Accessed 31 
March 2020 
Quintin A, Tougas M-L (2020) Generating Respect for the Law by Non-State Armed Groups: The ICRC’s Role 
and Activities. In: Heffes E, Kotlik M, Ventura, M (eds) International Humanitarian Law and Non-State Actors: 
Debates, Law and Practice. Asser Press/Springer, The Hague/Berlin, pp 353-386 
Rodenhäuser T (2018) Organizing Rebellion: Non-State Armed Groups under International Humanitarian Law, 
Human Rights Law, and International Criminal Law. Oxford University Press, Oxford 
Schneckener U, Hofmann C (2015) The power of persuasion. The role of international non-governmental 
organizations in engaging armed groups. In: Krieger H (ed) Inducing Compliance with International 
Humanitarian Law: Lessons from the African Great Lakes Region. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
pp 79-111 
Snyder E (2009) Waging Peace: Women, Restorative Justice, and the Pursuit of Human Rights in the Solomon 
Islands. Refugee Watch 32:67-79 
Spencer M (1970) Weber on Legitimate Norms and Authority. The British Journal of Sociology 21(2):123-134 
Terry F, McQuinn B (2018) Behind the scenes: The Roots of Restraint in War study. https://blogs.icrc.org/law-
and-policy/2018/06/18/roots-of-restraint-armed-groups/. Accessed 31 March 2020 
Tyler T (2006) Why People Obey the Law. Princeton University Press, Princeton 
 26 
UN Aids (2009) Partnership with Faith-based Organizations: UN AIDS Strategic Framework. 
https://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/media_asset/20100326_jc1786_partnership_fbo_en_0.pdf. 
Accessed 31 March 2020 
UN Development Programme (2014) UNDP Guidelines on Engaging with Faith-Based Organizations and 
Religious Leaders. http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/documents/partners/2014_UNDP_Guidelines-on-
Engaging-with-FBOs-and-Religious-Leaders_EN.pdf. Accessed 31 March 2020 
UN Environment Programme (2018) Engaging with Faith Based Organizations. UN Environment Strategy. 
https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/25989/UNEP%20Strategy%20Engaging%20FBOs.p
df?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. Accessed 31 March 2020 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (2014) Partnership Note on Faith-based Organizations, Local Faith 
Communities and Faith Leaders. https://www.unhcr.org/539ef28b9.pdf. Accessed 31 March 2020 
UN Human Rights Council (2016) International Independent Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic: 
“They Came to Destroy”: ISIS Crimes Against the Yazidis, UN Doc. A/HRC/32/CRP.2 
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2017) Beirut Declaration and its 18 commitments on 
“Faith for Rights”. https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomReligion/Pages/FaithForRights.aspx. Accessed 
31 March 2020 
UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict (2013) The 
Six Grave Violations Against Children During Armed Conflict: The Legal Foundation. 
https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/publications/WorkingPaper-
1_SixGraveViolationsLegalFoundation.pdf. Accessed 31 March 2020 
UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict (2018) Human 
Rights Council Report: Direct Engagement with Parties to Conflict Brings Progress but Grave Violations 
Against Children Continue. https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/direct-engagement-parties-conflict-
brings-progress-grave-violations-children-continue/. Accessed 31 March 2020 
UN Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect (2017) Plan of Action for Religious Leaders 
and Actors to Prevent Incitement to Violence that Could Lead to Atrocities Crimes. 
https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/Plan%20of%20Action%20Advanced%20Copy.pdf. 
Accessed 31 March 2020 
UN Population Fund (2009) Guidelines for Engaging Faith-based Organisations (FBOs) as Agents of Change. 
https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/resource-pdf/fbo_engagement.pdf. Accessed 31 March 2020  
Vinjamuri L, Boesnecker A (2008) Religious Actors and Transitional Justice. In: Banchoff T (ed) Religious 
Pluralism, Globalization, and World Politics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 155-88 
Weinstein J (2007) Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
Wiener M (2012) Engaging with Religious Communities. Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 1(1):37-56 
Zaragoza J (2020) Colombia: Mapping of armed conflicts and religious leaders’ activities (on file with the authors) 
 
Cases 
 
ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, [1996] ICJ Rep 226 
 27 
ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 
9 July 2004, [2004] ICJ Rep 136 
ICJ, Case concerning Armed Activities on the territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v 
Uganda), Judgment, 19 December 2005, [2005] ICJ Rep 168 
ICTR, Prosecutor v Athanase Seromba, Judgement, 13 December 2006, Case No. ICTR-2001-66-I 
ICTR, Prosecutor v Athanase Seromba, Judgement, 12 March 2008, Case No. ICTR-2001-66-A 
ICTR, Prosecutor v Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gérard Ntakirutimana, Judgment and Sentence, 21 February 
2003, Case Nos. ICTR-96-10 and ICTR-96-17-T 
ICTR, Prosecutor v Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gérard Ntakirutimana, Judgment, 13 December 2004, Case 
Nos. ICTR-96-10-A and ICTR-96-17-A 
